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Introduction 
Syria has been undergoing six years of civil turmoil which has led to a diaspora of 
Syrian refugees, and last year the United States under President Obama took steps to 
bring in an unprecedented 12,587 persons . On January 27th, 2017, President Donald 1
Trump signed Executive Order 13769, “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist 
Entry Into the United States,” fully suspending non-citizen entry from seven countries, 
including refugees from Syria for 120 days . In the wake of this sudden about-face in 2
United States policy and how it affects refugee groups, we are impelled to discern what 
the responsibility of the United States is towards any refugees of conflict. 
 
On an Anti-Realist position concerning Nation States, statements concerning the 
responsibilities of the United States are not strictly and literally true, but only true (if at 
all) by reference to the responsibilities other entities. For instance, a statement 
regarding the responsibility of the United States to ensure the rights of the citizens might 
be true only in virtue of being a statement about the obligation of members holding 
positions who have it within their capability to ensure rights. 
 
On a Realist account of Nation States on the other hand, statements concerning the 
responsibilities of the United States are strictly and literally true dependent upon facts 
about Nation States, the kinds of things Nation States are, and the kind of Nation State 
that the United States is. 
 
In this essay, I will argue that a Hobbesian Realist position concerning Nation States 
and their generative grounds in the Social Contract obligates the United States to 
accept any and all refugees of conflict who are willing to recognize the sovereign power 
of the United States by submitting to citizenship requirements determined by the United 
States. 
The Stateless Agents 
I am grounding much of my argument on the analysis of sovereign powers and authority 
from Thomas Hobbes’s, “Leviathan: or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common 
Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil.” Hobbes’s account of the generation of sovereign 
powers begins with the condition of nature and the facts concerning the nature of the 
1 ​"Syrian Refugees in the United States." Migrationpolicy.org. Migration Policy Institute, 02 Mar. 2017. Web. 14 Mar. 2017. 
2  ​Trump, Donald J. "Executive Order Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States." The White House. 
The United States Government, 06 Mar. 2017. Web. 14 Mar. 2017. 
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relations of stateless agents. The condition of nature, for Hobbes, encompasses many 
intricate details about statelessness. Although many of his subsequent arguments 
reference the condition of nature for their rational justification, my arguments (as far as 
they are sourced in Hobbes’s social contract theory) will be made assuming a less 
powerful and exhaustive claims regarding the stateless condition.  
 
Regardless of what the stateless condition is like further than this, the assumption of 
primary importance is that in a stateless condition an individual has no obligation to 
recognize any societally dependent obligation towards anyone else. Consider this my 
first premise. Societally dependent obligations are grounded in an agent’s standing in a 
particular relation to a sovereign authority and other agents involved in a social 
compact. For those of us in a societal compact, stateless agents represent a threat to 
our compact in virtue of lacking any obligation to recognize civil authorities and 
obligations. Although their threat does not necessarily take the form of a violent warring 
condition, simply the lack of obligation for stateless agents represents a complicating 
state of affairs for those inside inside of social compacts. The lack of obligation here is 
what grounds the potential for threatening the social compact.  
 
In any transaction between two agents where societal obligations play a role in fixing 
norms or values of actions or factors, it is possible for a person outside of such 
obligations to complicate the transaction for persons with such obligations by extracting 
benefits of the transaction without paying the costs. In short, agents without societal 
obligations represent a free-rider problem for agents with such obligations. 
The Natural Laws, Obligations, and the State 
The second premise of my argument is that the governing principle of relations between 
political entities is Hobbes’ first law of nature and its derivative law:  
 
“the first and fundamental law… seek peace and follow it… [and derived from the 
first] this second law: that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth 
as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this 
right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he 
would allow other men against himself.” 
 
I hope it may be taken as a given that political entities should be seeking peace, but I 
think there is a strong argument for this peace grounds the possibility for the existence 
of political entities as political entities. 
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To ensure the peace arrived at between the persons who come together, an absolute 
sovereign power is realized by the persons in the form of a sovereign authority, which is 
a governing body that the sovereign power is granted to. The citizens give up the 
entirety of their political powers into the single sovereign power, and the sovereign 
power becomes embodied in the sovereign authority. The reason the sovereign power 
is absolute is because otherwise the peace could not be guaranteed, as the citizens 
would have legitimate authoritative power to undermine the compact for peace for which 
the sovereign power is created to safeguard.  
 
The Nation State then is the sovereign power, its embodiment, and that which is subject 
to the authority of the sovereign power. In this case, the United States is the sovereign 
power, the government, and the people and lands over which it has authority. 
 
The laws of nature which explain the need for the creation of the Nation State do not 
only constrain person entities, however. They also serve as the grounds for the 
obligations of Nation States, insofar as the Nation State is created to fulfill a duty. Nation 
States’ obligations are grounded, as Hobbes recognizes as well: 
 
“...in the end for which he [the person or group that wields the sovereign power] 
was trusted with the sovereign power, namely the procuration of the safety of the 
people, to which he is obliged by the law of nature...But by safety here is not 
meant a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which every 
man by lawful industry, without danger or hurt to the Commonwealth, shall 
acquire to himself.” 
 
This leads to my third premise, that the sovereign power is given its power under 
contractual obligations towards ensuring the meeting of the directive of the law of nature 
in safety of life and livelihood for the constituents, for which if it does not or cannot fulfill 
this obligation is it then dissolved, if not in body then in authority, and the citizens 
returned all rights given and subsequently returned to a stateless existence. 
Refugees Are Stateless Persons 
My fourth premise is the claim that refugees are stateless persons. This follows from a 
definition of refugees as we encounter them in the world and how the definition interacts 
with my third premise.  
 
The refugees of the Syrian Civil War are my example case for illustrating why we should 
consider refugees stateless persons by my second premise. 
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Refugees of the Syrian Civil War are fleeing violent conflict that has arisen in their 
homeland. The citizenry of the Syrian region are under threat to life any livelihood. If the 
Syrian Nation States are real entities, with the real obligation to seek and ensure the 
safety of the citizenry, then the Syrian refugees are those for whom the Nation States 
were unable to fulfill this obligation and therefore no longer are the authoritative 
sovereign powers for.  
 
Refugees, in general, are those in flight from their homeland due to threat to life and 
livelihood which either surpasses the protective powers of the originator Nation State, or 
is a result of the Nation State’s actions directly. Because of the Nation State failing in its 
obligation to ensure the protection of the livelihood of those members who become 
refugees, the compact between those members and sovereign authority is dissolved, 
and they become stateless. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that being a refugee 
is contingent upon being stateless and that refugees are necessarily stateless. 
The United States Obligation Towards Refugees 
In the previous two sections I laid out the premises which ground my argument 
supporting my claim that the United States has an obligation to take in any and all 
refugees willing to recognize and respect the sovereign power and authority of the 
United States by submitting to our social compact. 
 
My argument is as follows, numbers represent concrete premises/conclusions, and 
letters represent elaborations on premises: 
 
1. Stateless agents have no obligations grounded in societal compacts. 
a. Stateless agents therefore are complicators to entities involved in societal 
compacts. 
2. Political entities are obligated to seek peace, and to follow it. 
a. For political entities to seek peace, and follow it, they are obligated to 
(assuming others are similarly inclined to do so) enter into compacts for 
the purpose of assuring the peace and security of the entities. 
b. To ensure their compact, an absolute sovereign power must be set up by 
the compact’s constituents giving up their rights, for the purpose of 
maintaining the peace, security, and safety of the compact’s constituents. 
c. The sovereign power is given embodiment in a sovereign authority. 
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3. The sovereign authority’s existence and obligations are grounded in fulfilling the 
purpose for which it was set up, which is maintaining the peace and security of 
the constituents of the compact. 
a. If the sovereign authority cannot, or will not, maintain the safety of the 
people for which it was given the sovereign power, then its authority is 
dissolved and all rights are given back to the (now stateless) constituents. 
b. Nation States are the sovereign power, its embodiment in a sovereign 
authority, and the constituents of the compact for which the sovereign 
power was laid up. 
c. Nation States are distinctly real political entities because they are capable 
of being obligated to do things which the members cannot be obligated to 
do. 
4. Refugees are stateless persons. 
a. Refugees are those fleeing threat to life and livelihood from where they 
were originally citizens. 
b. Because refugees safety cannot or is not ensured by their originator 
Nation State, the sovereign authority over them is dissolved, their rights 
are returned, and they are subsequently stateless. 
5. Therefore,  
a. because refugees are stateless persons, and  
b. because stateless persons represent a complicator for the security of 
persons in the social compact, and 
c. because the Nation State is obligated to seek peace and follow it due to 
being a political entity, and 
d. because the Nation State is obligated to ensure the safety of its citizenry, 
e. then, should any refugee be willing to submit to the social compact, and 
f. should any refugee be willing to recognize and respect the sovereign 
authority, 
g. the obligation towards peace, the safety of the citizenry, and the security 
of the social compact demands that the refugee be taken into the citizenry 
and out of the stateless condition. 
6. Therefore, the United States (as a particular Nation State) is obligated to take in 
any refugees willing to recognize and respect the sovereign authority of the 
United States and enter into our societal compact. 
 
The United States is obligated to take in all refugees of the particular kind (meeting the 
criterion) that I have outlined above. 
 
8 
Critique 
There are two critiques I would like to examine as possible critiques of my argument. 
 
The first critique I examine is the denial of 3c, that Nation States are distinctly real 
political entities. It may be argued that statements about Nation States are not strictly 
and literally true, and that any number of reductions may be made which render talk of 
the obligations of Nation States meaningless. To this I argue first that we should 
consider Nation States as real because they have powers in virtue of being a Nation 
State which the constituent agents that comprise it do not have in virtue of their being 
the kinds of entities that they are. However, I also argue that, even should it be the case 
then that the statements about Nation States could be reduced to statements about 
constituents, that the relations taking place at these lower levels still have the necessary 
obligatory framework provided my above argument to obligate them towards the same 
conclusion I have reached. 
 
The second critique against my position is that taking in refugees might violate the 
Nation State’s obligation to the ensuring the peace and safety of the citizenry. In this 
way then, the argument is that my conclusion does not necessarily follow from my 
premises. For instance, the justificatory grounds of Executive Order 13769 may be that 
it was for the purpose of ensuring the safety of citizens that all non-citizen entry be 
banned (including that of refugees). It may be argued that, since we could not determine 
who was or was not a terrorist in those groups coming from countries known to be 
contain terrorist groups, all travel had to be banned. These cases then, it might be 
argued, show a counter-example to my argument. 
 
In response to this criticism I would like to point out that such critique is grounded in a 
kind of distinctly epistemic problem which does not bear on my argument. I have not 
argued that the United States is obligated to take in terrorists, nor those who do not 
recognize nor respect the sovereign authority nor our distinct social compact. Towards 
those individuals, the United States may be obligated to ensure the safety of the 
citizenry in other ways. Neither is the United States obligated to take in those who only 
‘seem’ to meet the criterion I outlined. The obligations take place independently of these 
epistemic concerns regarding determination of agents dispositions. In this critique, it 
was not that taking in refugees who met the criterion outlined in my conclusion generate 
the safety and security concerns that could inform a counter-example, but that taking in 
those who did not meet my criterion generate a concern for safety and security. The 
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United States non-obligation to these individuals does not bear on the obligation the 
United States has to others. 
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